On-Demand Jet Charters and CRM

"Why On-Demand Jet Charter Needs CRM - Now!" is the attention-getting title of a new paper prepared by Robert Baron, president of a consulting company specializing in crew resource management (CRM) training. Baron's paper deals with CRM shortcomings leading up to the fatal March 29, 2001, crash of a Gulfstream III at Aspen, Colorado. All aboard were killed when the charter jet crashed into sloping terrain some 2,400 feet short of the runway. Highlights of Baron's critique illustrate shocking lapses:

* "It appears that the captain had a case of 'push on-it is.' This is a term for a mental commitment to land the aircraft regardless of the consequences. The first officer may have neglected the step-down fix callouts because of the 'halo effect.' This occurs when a first officer, who is acting in a subservient role, trusts the captain's judgment because 'he knows what he's doing, he'll be fine.' This 'trust,' or non-assertive behavior, can create big problems in the cockpit."

* "The crew continued past the missed approach point in an attempt to gain visual contact with the runway ... a more assertive first officer may have made a difference at that point."

* "An aircraft limitation was exceeded when the spoilers were extended with the landing gear down and the flaps set to full. Again, an assertive first officer ... may have broken a link in the chain. Both pilots ... knew that the use of spoilers in that configuration was not approved. Yet, nobody said anything."

* "Since there was a lack of an approach/missed approach briefing or any urgency in respect to the approach, the first officer's lack of callouts probably ... let the captain fly the approach 'single pilot' right into the ground."

* "The pressure put on this crew to get into Aspen fueled ... the breakdown in the communication process. If the departure from Los Angeles wasn't delayed and there was no curfew at Aspen for night operations, the pressure (both real and perceived) may have had a different effect on the crew. But those two factors certainly played into the pressure of getting in to Aspen."

* "If the crew was more assertive with the passengers, the possibility of not getting in and having to fly to the alternate airport, the outcome may have been different. Pressure from passengers, no matter how rich or famous they are, cannot override the good judgment and decision behavior of an experienced flight crew. Passenger pressure must be mitigated."

* "The ambiguity of the NOTAM (notice to airmen) gave the first officer the impression that the approach was authorized at night but the circle-to-land procedure was not. The inference that a straight in landing for runway 15 was still authorized was very real. Because of this, critical flight information was dismissed by the first officer, and [was] not passed on to the captain as part of a pre-flight briefing. Once again, the communication process had broken down."